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Abstract 
 Following World War I, the US commercial aviation industry began to take off as the 
federal government sought private airlines to carry mail across the country. By 1938, the 
government set the industry under strict regulation, and carriers started relying more on 
passenger service as a source of revenue. During this regulated era, the airlines could not use 
price competition to win customers resulting in carriers using scheduling flexibility and quality 
of service to compete. Regulation ensured carriers a stable return and passengers with a safe 
mode of transportation. However, by the early 1970s, economists and politicians concluded that 
the strict regulatory environment led to an inefficient market outcome. In 1978, the government 
deregulated the airline industry ending the regulatory constraints on fares, entry and exit, and 
service amenities. After almost 40 years of a deregulated domestic airline market, the time is 
appropriate to observe the effects of both policy regimes and to study how deregulation affected 
the US airline industry. 
 This thesis seeks to organize and present various yet dispersed sources of economic 
history, analysis, and commentary in order to compare and contrast the effects of regulation and 
deregulation on the airline industry. The detailed discussion of various “retail metrics” aims to 
illustrate the current economic instability plaguing the industry. The first section provides an 
economic history of the development of the domestic airline industry. The next section briefly 
describes the motivations behind deregulation. The third section reviews various industry metrics 
and economic literature to compare and contrast the effects of regulation and deregulation. The 
fourth section explains the successes and failures of economic deregulation in the context of the 
last decade. The thesis concludes with a short discussion of various suggested policy options.   
Keywords: airlines, deregulation, network economics, economic instability   
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I.  Introduction 
 Beginning in 1938, the US federal government began to regulate the domestic 
commercial airlines by setting fares, controlling entry / exit and merger policy, and establishing 
safety standards. Under this strict regulatory environment, the airline industry would carry more 
and more passengers and earn stable returns over the next 40 years, but in the 1970s, a growing 
consensus of economists and politicians concluded that regulation promoted an inefficient 
market outcome. At the forefront of federal economic deregulation, the airlines were freed in 
1978 from almost all regulatory constraints including fares, entry and exit on routes, and service 
amenities. Airlines faced 40 years in a highly regulated market and will soon have experienced 
40 years of the competitive forces of a deregulated market. These nearly equal time periods 
present an ideal opportunity to observe the effects of both broad policies and to study the results 
of deregulation in today’s US airline industry.  
 The goal of this thesis is to organize and present various yet dispersed sources of 
economic history, analysis, and commentary.  This information will be used to convey the 
current economic condition of the domestic airline industry.  Then, through the use of a 
multitude of available “retail” metrics, this thesis will compare and contrast both eras of 
regulation and deregulation in order to provide guidance for the formulation of future airline 
policies. To complete this task, this document is divided into four main sections. The first 
describes the economic history of the commercial aviation industry in the US from its emergence 
in the early 20
th
 century through the regulated period between 1938 and 1978. The next brief 
section provides the motivations for economic deregulation in 1978. The third section introduces 
various industry metrics and economic literature to demonstrate the economic effects following 
deregulation. The fourth section seeks to consider the successes and failures of economic 
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deregulation in the context of the industry’s performance over the past decade and hopefully to 
provide forward-looking insights to the long-run sustainability of the airline industry. The thesis 
concludes with a brief discussion of various suggested policy options.   
II. Regulatory Retrospective: 1938 - Present 
Commercial aviation in the United States has changed drastically since its humble 
beginning after World War I. Today, hundreds of millions of Americans travel across the country 
every year with relative ease and affordable fares. However, the current convenience obscures 
the early struggles of the industry to get off the ground. The fledgling industry needed help from 
both government and entrepreneurial businessmen before it could grow to become one of the 
largest industries in the country. This section provides an outline of the foundations of the 
commercial aviation industry in the US since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and the history is 
drawn largely from T.A. Heppenheimer’s Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation.  
After World War I, people could afford to buy cheap aircraft and engines thanks to a 
large post-wartime surplus.  Initially, planes were mostly used for crop-dusting, skywriting, 
aerial mapping, and short county-to-county taxi services.
1
 At this time, railroads were the major 
form of passenger transportation for intercity traveling and transcontinental journeys as aircraft 
technology was still in its infancy. The US Post Office Department had contracts with the 
railroads to carry mail cross-country, but this department wanted a faster and cheaper option for 
moving mail across such an expansive and growing country. The PO Department began 
operating airplanes on routes between Washington, DC, Philadelphia, and New York City in the 
Spring of 1918, but at these short distances, the speed of these early aircraft could not compete 
                                                 
1
 T.A. Heppenheimer. Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1995), 6. 
 Institutional Setting and Carrier Viability in the Airline Industry  6 
 
with the economics of trains.
2
In 1920, the PO Department began a transcontinental route to San 
Francisco. Pilots followed the Union Pacific Railroad for navigation while hopping between 
landing fields about 200 miles apart.  Still, the railroads had the advantage of being able to travel 
at night.
3
 Then, the PO Department started to place beacons and lights on certain segments of the 
transcontinental route allowing for their planes to operate through the night.  This innovation 
allowed planes to beat trains by two to three days.  By 1924, planes could make the cross-
country trip in about 30 hours.
4
  As railroads began to lose revenues from the Post Office’s 
switch to their own airmail, Congress passed the Contract Air Mail Act of 1925 which forced the 
PO Department to sell airmail contracts to private carriers, including the railroads, could buy.
5
 
Many entrepreneurs of the era began to bid for airmail contracts such as William Rockefeller, 
Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, and Henry Ford.
6
 As the airmail industry began to take off, 
Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act of 1926 which required certificates and registration of 
aircraft, pilot and crew training, and air traffic rules.  Additionally, the Department of Commerce 
began to produce maps and weather reports for pilots, investigate airplane accidents, and build 
more illuminated airways.
7
 Juan Trippe was one of the leading airline businessmen in the 
industry’s early history and was the face of Pan American Airlines. He used political connections 
to influence the Foreign Air Mail Act of 1928 and was later able to control the mail route to 
Cuba. The Foreign Air Mail Act allowed the PO Department to award airmail contracts to the 
“lowest responsible bidders” instead of simply the lowest bidder.
8
 This provision would be 
highly important as airmail service continued expanding domestically and internationally. 
                                                 
2
 Ibid, 8. 
3
 Ibid, 9. 
4
 Ibid, 11. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Ibid, 12. 
7
 Ibid, 14.  
8
 Ibid, 28.  
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Maybe a visionary, Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown thought airmail contracts 
were inefficient and expensive and saw the future of commercial aviation in larger planes and 
passenger transportation. He used his position and influence to push for the McNary-Watres Air 
Mail Act of 1930 which gave Brown authority to change airmail policy in pursuit of his dream 
vision for the industry.
9
 Just as Brown had hoped, this new provision provided an incentive for 
the airlines to shift focus from cargo to passenger revenue growth. Another controversial 
provision gave Brown the authority to extend or consolidate routes that he felt would better the 
public’s interest.
10
 Brown wanted three transcontinental routes (northern, central, and southern) 
operated by three separate carriers. In May 1930, Brown met with representatives of the largest 
airlines (purposely excluding the small airlines) in what would later be called the “Spoils 
Conference”.
11
 After initial disagreements and antitrust concerns, Brown and the airlines decided 
that Transcontinental Air Transport and Western Air Express would merge to form 
Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA) and take the central route, American Airways the 
southern route, and United Airlines the northern route.
12
 Brown was able to ensure that his 
choice airlines would win the routes using the “lowest responsible bidder” clause to eliminate the 
other bidders.
13
 Although there was opposition to Brown’s decisions, he was successful with 
creating four major domestic carriers (including Eastern Airlines which operated along the 
Atlantic Coast).
14
 Not only did Brown drastically change the industry’s structure with his 
handpicked carriers, his decision to change the airmail rate to a volume-based rate helped to spur 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, 34.  
10
 Edmund Preston, “U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission: The Federal Aviation Administration and Its 
Predecessor Agencies, “Centennial of Flight,” accessed February 10, 2014, “U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission: 
The Federal Aviation Administration and Its Predecessor Agencies.” Centennial of Flight. Accessed February 10, 
2014. http://www.centennialofflight.net/essay/Government_Role/FAA_History/POL8.htm. 
11
 T.A. Heppenheimer. Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1995), 34-5. 
12




 Ibid.  
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innovation as airlines had to increase speeds to compete with railroads for passengers.
15
 Aircraft 
manufacturers began to develop new airplanes with new technologies that increased cruising 
speed and carrying capacity. In 1931, Delta acquired 2-years of exclusive use of the new Boeing 
247 which could carry 10 passengers giving Delta a competitive advantage over its 
competitors.
16
 In response, Douglas Aircraft developed the DC-2 which was faster and could 
carry 12 passengers to compete with Boeing’s 247.
17
 The rivalry between Boeing and Douglas 
would become an important part of development of the airline industry. 
After Postmaster General Brown used his authority to limit competitive bidding of 
airmail contracts, Senator Hugo Black began investigations into airline collusion and Brown’s 
involvement.
18
 In addition to Brown hand-choosing airlines to succeed, Black’s investigations 
found that the airline holding companies were manipulating stocks prices. These findings helped 
support the case for securities industry reform such as the Glass-Steagall Act and the Securities 
and Exchange Act.
19
 Upon hearing the findings of Black’s investigations, in February 1934, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt canceled all government airmail contracts and requested the 
Army Air Corps deliver mail until new contracts were made, but the Air Corps pilots had no 
experience flying in bad weather, at night, or on the mail routes; this decision led to disastrous 
consequences.
20
 After several pilots crashed and died in the first weeks, the public outrage 
against Roosevelt was high while the airlines were suffering from lost revenues from airmail 
contracts, but he required the airlines paid a steep price to win back the government contracts.
21
 
Under the Air Mail Act of 1934, airline officials who took part at the “Spoils Conference” were 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, 37. 
16
 Ibid, 47. 
17
 Ibid, 53-4.  
18
 Ibid, 56. 
19
 Ibid, 57. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid, 59-60. 
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barred from industry leadership, aviation holding companies had to break up so that aircraft 
manufacturers could not buy an airline to guarantee a market for its aircraft, and the airmail rates 
were drastically decreased.
22
 In the end many airlines did regain their old routes, but Braniff 
Airways and Delta Air Lines won their first routes and would become major players in the 
industry.
23
 Juan Trippe’s Pan Am was not affected by FDR’s cancellation as it only applied to 




In response to the government’s cuts in airmail rates, the airlines needed to rely more on 
revenues from passenger services. The Douglas DC-3 would provide the next step forward as it 
was faster and had lower operating costs than previous aircraft leading to shorter travel times and 
lower fares which made airline travel accessible to more Americans as the country climbed out 
of the Great Depression.
25
 Between 1938 and 1940, passenger traffic doubled to 3 million 




In 1939, Howard Hughes entered the industry when he bought a controlling share of 
TWA. He would drastically alter the fate of the airline industry. As his competitors United and 
American focused on the development of a slightly improved DC-4, Hughes and Lockheed 
secretly began development on a superior aircraft, the Lockheed Constellation (or Connie).  The 
Lockheed would have a pressurized cabin allowing it to fly above weather and prevent 
airsickness and it would be capable of cruising at 280mph.
27
 By keeping this design secret and 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, 60-1. 
23
 Ibid, 63. 
24
 Ibid, 67. 
25




 Ibid, 111-2. 
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exclusive to TWA, Hughes anticipated a major competitive advantage over his rivals who would 
be flying the inferior DC-4.  However, in 1941 while the DC-4 and Connie were still under 
development, the War Department exposed the secret as the attack on Pearl Harbor led the Army 
Air Forces to draft both these aircraft into wartime service. Despite the performance advantages 
of the Lockheed plane, the Army Air Force preferred the simpler DC-4.
28
 In response to the 
Connie, Douglas quickly began to develop the DC-6 but would be years behind the Connie 
which had shown in its April 1944 test flight that it was the first plane that could fly nonstop 
from coast to coast.
29
 After World War II ended, the Army’s demand for the DC-4 resulted in a 
post-war surplus.  This allowed airlines to buy aircraft and retrofit it for airline service.
30
 To 
compete with TWA’s coast-to-coast service, American and United did not receive their DC-6 
orders until the Spring of 1947.
31
  
In April 1945, Trippe helped to organize a cartel of international carriers (many of which 
were operated by national governments) called the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) which set fares by unanimous consent and was enforced by their governments.
32
 After 
World War II, European carriers needed new aircraft and under the Marshall Plan and with the 
help of IATA, Europe became a major export market for the American airplane manufacturing 
industry.
33
 Also after World War II, TWA sought to compete with Pan Am for overseas routes 
and changed its name to Trans World Airlines in 1945.
34
 Before the war, Hughes had disclosed 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, 114. 
29




 Ibid, 116. 
32




 Ibid, 118. 
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Prior to World War II, the federal government made a decision which would dramatically 
alter the future of the commercial aviation industry. In 1938, President Roosevelt signed the 
Civil Aeronautics Act which would define the airline industry for the next forty years. An 
independent Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) would investigate accidents and make 
recommendations to ensure air transport safety.
36
 In 1940, President Roosevelt split the CAA 
into the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) under the Department of Commerce and the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB); the CAA was responsible for Air Traffic Control, pilot and 
aircraft certification, enforcement of safety regulations, and development of new airways while 
the CAB was charged with writing safety regulations, investigating accidents, and economic 
regulating of the airlines.
37
 It also brought the government’s air traffic control centers and airport 
control towers into standardization with new regulations forcing pilots to obey controllers’ 
instructions and requiring aircraft to carry mandated flight instruments for flying in bad 
weather.
38
 In 1941, the CAA opened Air Traffic Controllers training facilities and standardized 
procedures, equipment, and taxi and traffic patterns.
39
 The new economic and safety regulations 
had dramatic impacts on the industry over the next forty years. For instance, during the 1940s, 
the fatality rate steadily dropped with new safety regulations while between 1940 and 1946, the 
cost of an average ticket decreased by 33 percent (constant dollars) which allowed the airlines to 




 “The Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective, 1903-2008: Chapter 1: Prologue,” Accessed 
March 31, 2014, https://www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/, 5.  
37
 Ibid, 5-6. 
38
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compete directly with the railroads for passenger services.
40
 To guarantee the airlines with a fair 
rate of return, the CAB set fares and determined routes and controlled market entry and exit. The 
regulation of the airlines prevented interstate domestic carriers from exposure to competitive 




In the late 1940s, the birth of nonscheduled airlines which flew during off-peak hours 
using cheap surplus military planes brought some level of competition to the industry because 
these “nonskeds” would only fly if enough passengers showed up in response to very low fares.
42
 
Although these carriers offered low comfort and poor service for low prices, the major carriers 
reacted by offering reduced coach class fares.
43
 Consumers’ willingness to trade lower fares for 
discomfort was a hint of the future of the airline industry. Around the same time, Douglas and 
Lockheed began another round of aircraft competition with the DC-6B and Super Constellation, 
respectively, which offered the first true transcontinental journey as these planes could carry 
substantially more passengers and were fast enough to abide by the work rules of the pilots’ 
unions.
44
 However, these advanced propeller-driven planes would soon be eclipsed.  The US Air 
Force was pushing the development of the jet engine. The British beat the Americans with this 
technical advancement when they commercialized the de Havilland Comet in early 1952.
45
 
Despite its high operating costs, the quieter and much faster Comet attracted enough passengers 
for British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) to profit from these new airliners.
46
 Even 
though the British success caught the attention of US airline executives such as Trippe, US 
                                                 
40
 Ibid, 124-5. 
41
 Ibid, 125. 
42
 Ibid, 126-7. 
43
 Ibid, 127. 
44
 Ibid, 130. 
45
 Ibid, 155.  
46
 Ibid, 156. 
 Institutional Setting and Carrier Viability in the Airline Industry  13 
 




While Boeing had been successful in the military aircraft market, the aircraft 
manufacturer attempted to enter the commercial market with Lockheed and Douglas by 
designing the Dash-80 (or Boeing 707). Boeing’s original design sought to serve both military 
and civil needs, selling it first to the Air Force as a jet-tanker to cover the costs of development 
and then the commonalities would cut costs for the commercial version.
48
 In May 1954, Boeing 
announced the jetliner called the Dash-80 at the same time the Comet was plummeting from the 
skies of success, quite literally.
49
 After some of the first Comets crashed due to metal fatigue, the 
Comet IV’s development was halted for redesign and recertification, putting the British behind in 
the jet game.
50
 While Boeing had the advantage of government funds supporting the 
development costs of its 707 program, Douglas’ strategy involved waiting for the airlines to react 
to the Boeing 707 design and then respond with its own improved design, the DC-8. Seeing an 
opportunity to use the aircraft manufacturer rivalry to his advantage, Trippe made the largest 
purchase in the history of the industry at the time when in October 1955 he ordered twenty 707s 
and twenty-five DC-8s for $269 million.
51
 Trippe preferred the DC-8 as it could reliably cross 
the Atlantic nonstop, unlike the 707, but the 707 would be ready earlier; he then would sell the 
707s when the DC-8 became available.
52
 Knowing the Boeing 707 was a losing gamble and that 
Boeing was unready to continue competing in the military market, Boeing CEO William Allen 
made a bold move: he ordered a redesign of the commercial 707 Intercontinental sacrificing the 
                                                 
47
 Ibid, 156-7. 
48
 Ibid, 154.  
49
 Ibid, 158.  
50
 Ibid, 160. 
51
 Ibid, 165. 
52
 Ibid. 
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commonality (i.e. cost savings) with the Air Force Tanker and offered the airlines custom 
versions of the 707.
53
 Boeing’s gamble would pay off in the end: Boeing sold almost a thousand 
707s over the 556 DC-8s sold by Douglas.
54
  
The age of the jetliner had begun, but airports were not ready for the increase in speeds 
and in the number of passengers.
55
 Under Eisenhower, the CAA faced deep spending cuts for 
facilities and equipment, yet the fatality rate continued to drop: in 1952 and then again in 1954, 
there were no fatalities.
56
 However, the cuts in spending on important programs for improving air 
traffic control would quickly prove costly. On June 30, 1956, two airplanes collided over the 
Grand Canyon killing 128 people.
57
 Unsurprisingly, the government reacted to tragedy by 
reversing its course with the CAA. The CAA’s budget began to increase rapidly afterwards with 
its originally 5-year ATC system upgraded in 3 years.
58
 In 1958, the CAA gained independence 
from the Department of Commerce.
59
 While the CAB would remain responsible for accident 
investigations, the newly established Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) was charged with safety-
rulemaking and reported directly to the President.
60
  
At the beginning of 1959, more airlines were introducing jetliner service on 
transcontinental routes, but few airports had runways long enough for jets to land.
61
 Also, the 
public began to complain loudly about the jet noise in communities surrounding airports, but the 
solution was the development of the turbofan (or fanjet) which provided better fuel economy and 
                                                 
53
 Ibid, 168-9. 
54
 Ibid, 169. 
55
 Ibid, 172. 
56
 Ibid, 175. 
57
 Ibid, 178. 
58
 Ibid, 181. 
59
 Ibid, 183. 
60
 Ibid.  
61
 Ibid, 185. 




 As public complaints about jet noise softened, the DC-8 and 707 Intercontinental 
could fly nonstop over 4000 miles giving airlines a substantial advantage over passenger travel 
by ocean liner or rail, which were already facing competition from automobiles and the new built 
interstate highway system.
63
 The age of the jetliner led people to envision the future of jets that 
travelled at supersonic speeds, but these ambitions would not prove as fruitful as the jetliner. 
In the early 1960s, the French and British began a development program for the 
supersonic Concorde.
64
 The British saw this project as a second chance after the brief success yet 
ultimate failure of the Comet; the French, under Charles de Gaulle, resented the American 
domination of European markets, and the British needed French support to enter the European 
Common Market.
65
 The Concorde project provided a mutually beneficial opportunity for both 
countries. In the US, President John F. Kennedy directed the FAA to develop the American 
supersonic transport (SST) to challenge the Concorde program, and the new head of the FAA 
was a strong supporter of the SST.
66
 Again, Trippe saw this competition between the American 
SST and Anglo-French Concorde as business opportunity: he announced that he intended to 
order six Concordes but preferred American SSTs.
67
 However, both these supersonic jet 
programs would face huge financial problem in their countries which would make them highly 
contested national projects. After the US airlines refused to cover 25 percent of the SST 
development costs, an outside commission determined that government should cover 90 
percent.
68
 Also, the FAA would remain in control of the SST project, but high-level decisions 
would be made by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara who would only move forward if the 
                                                 
62
 Ibid, 186-7. 
63
 Ibid, 191. 
64
 Ibid, 200. 
65
 Ibid, 202, 205.  
66




 Ibid, 212. 
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SST promised profitability, resulting in many delays for more and more analyzes.
69
 Across the 
Atlantic, the Concorde started experiencing cost overruns in 1964 and British government began 
to see the Concorde as a prestige project and wanted to cancel, but since the treaty between 
France and Britain did not include a cancellation clause, Britain was unable to abandon the 
Concorde and was forced to continue with the Concorde program.
70
  
 While Britain, France and the US were focused on building supersonic commercial jets, 
the US Air Force selected Lockheed in September 1965 to develop a wide-body subsonic aircraft 
called the C-5A which would offer huge economies of scale.
71
 At the time, the US airline 
industry believed that the supersonic jets like the SST would fly overwater routes because sonic 
booms would prevent it from taking over domestic routes and wide-bodies, such as the Boeing 
747, would be used for air freight.
72
 Boeing took another huge gamble by investing in a new 
facility in Everett, Washington to build the enormous Boeing 747.
73
 In April 1966, Trippe 
ordered 23 passenger 747 and two freight 747s for $531 million and five other airlines followed 
with another 28 more orders.
74
 After Lockheed won the C-5A contract, Boeing began 
development on the 747, but then Boeing won the SST proposal in 1966.
75
 In the meantime, 
American Airlines wanted something bigger than the current jetliners yet smaller than the 747, 
and Douglas and Lockheed aimed to fill this market need with the DC-10 and L-1011, 
respectively.
76
 The five major airlines (American, Eastern, United, TWA, and Delta) would 
determine which aircraft would succeed. First, American agreed to buy 25 DC-10s, hoping that 
the airlines would choose either Douglas or Lockheed, and the winner would be able to compete 
                                                 
69
 Ibid, 214.  
70
 Ibid, 214-5. 
71
 Ibid, 220. 
72
 Ibid, 221. 
73




 Ibid, 224-5. 
76
 Ibid, 225. 
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with Boeing in the next generation of planes.
77
 However, Eastern, TWA, and Delta placed orders 
for the L-1011.
78
 Last in line, Delta chose the DC-10 because its price was slashed to keep 




 Boeing and Pan Am’s 747 designs continued to get heavier requiring more powerful 
engines from Pratt & Whitney, and other design problems caused more delays.
80
 Then in 1970, a 
recession caused passenger growth to collapse and airlines subsequently cut their 747 orders 
which put Boeing in a difficult financial situation where the firm was forced to cut thousands of 
employees.
81
  To make matters worse, Boeing’s SST development started to run into problems 
and delays.
82
 At this time, Americans were becoming concerned about air and water pollution, 
and environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club opposed the SST program fearing 
damage to the ozone layer.
83
 Along with environmental concerns, many prominent economists 
including Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and Paul Samuelson signed a statement opposing 
the SST program on economic grounds.
84
 Despite union support, in December 1970, Congress 
voted to end the SST program dealing another blow to Boeing.
85
 With the SST program canceled 
and 747 orders cut, Boeing began to trim corporate fat and to make efficiencies in factory 
operations resulting in major reductions in building times.
86
 Boeing decided to improve earlier 
designs of the 727 and 737 with better engines with improved fuel efficiency and lower 
                                                 
77
 Ibid, 234. 
78
 Ibid, 235-6. 
79
 Ibid, 236-7. 
80
 Ibid, 231-3, 237-8. 
81
 Ibid, 239. 
82
 Ibid, 241. 
83
 Ibid, 244-5 
84
 Ibid, 245. 
85
 Ibid, 247.  
86
 Ibid, 255. 




 Sales of 707s, 727s, and 737s to domestic airlines and to growing Third World 
countries allowed Boeing to avoid bankruptcy long enough for 747 orders to pick up.
88
 
In January 1971, Rolls-Royce went bankrupt leaving Lockheed’s L-1011 without an 
engine and Lockheed itself was in the need of a federal loan guarantee to avoid bankruptcy.
89
 
After cutting the SST program, the Democratic Congress could not risk more jobs and the loan to 
Lockheed was approved.
90
 In the end, the L-1011never recouped its development costs, and 
Lockheed exited the commercial aviation industry and became solely a military contractor.
91
 The 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 program succeeded modestly, but it would be the last new airliner 
designed by the firm.
92
 With Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas in decline, Boeing was in a 
strong position for the future. The Concorde lost ground as  Pan Am and TWA decided against 
buying the supersonic jet as they were more expensive and less fuel efficient than wide-body 
planes which was of primary important during the two energy crises of the 1970s.
93
 
 During the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration, the FAA focused more on the SST 
program than air traffic control upgrades, but after two private aircraft and airliner collisions, the 
FAA would begin to computerize air traffic control.
94
 Since the FAA needed more money to 
implement these new air traffic control systems, Congress passed the Airport and Airway 
Development and Revenue Acts of 1970 to establish a fund for new taxes on tickets, air cargo, 
and fuel used by private planes and airliners.
95
 This act freed the FAA from Congressional 
                                                 
87
 Ibid, 256. 
88
 Ibid, 257. 
89
 Ibid, 253. 
90






 Ibid, 258-9. 
94
 Ibid, 267-9. 
95
 Ibid, 271. 
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appropriations and would provide more money as more people flew.
96
 Air Traffic Controllers 
were required to receive high level of training, but the working conditions were stressful and 
poor as overtime was mandatory with ten hour days, six days a week.
97
 In 1968, Air Traffic 
Controllers established the Professional Air Traffic Controller Organization (PATCO) which 
organized slowdowns and sickouts (as federal employees, they could not strike) causing major 
delays at airport in an effort to encourage the FAA to hire more controllers to spread workload, 
to increase pay, and to earn time and a half for overtime.
98
 The airlines sued PATCO for $100 
million in losses, and although PATCO settled for $100,000, the judge ordered PATCO to call 
off job actions.
99
 The union’s actions did win some work improvements: in 1972, Congress 
passed an act which allowed controllers to retire on pension between 50 and 55 and receive job 
training if needed.
100
 In 1977, another PATCO slowdown won controllers salary upgrades.
101
 
During his 1980 Presidential Campaign, Reagan promised to support PATCO if elected and, thus 
he won the union’s support.
102
 After Reagan won, PATCO began making high demands, but the 
FAA responded with much a lower counter offer leading to a PATCO strike in August 1981.
103
 
Instead of supporting PATCO, Reagan issued an ultimatum to the controllers: return to work in 
two days or lose their jobs.
104
 Only about 10% returned and the FAA fired 11,345 controllers, 
and Reagan froze PATCO’s strike fund and voided its legal right to represent the controllers.
105
 
The FAA and the airlines agreed to cut flights to stretch its limit resources, and the unionized 
pilots and airplane machinists refused to strike in support of PATCO, which was facing backlash 
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from the public as well.
106
 The FAA had to begin training an entire new generation of air traffic 
controllers forcing overtime on the small workforce while the agency tried to catch up.
107
  
 Although the British and French Concorde failed to change the airline industry as many 
had thought supersonic jets would, Germany, France, and Britain agreed in 1966 to pursue a 
design of a new twinjet airliner called the “Airbus”.
108
 Learning from the mistake of the 
Concorde program, France used a new arrangement removing the country’s ministries from 
decision-making, and the arrangement had the advantage of no legal requirement to publish 
corporate records or financial statements which kept the huge subsidies hidden.
109
 In October 
1972, the A-300 took its first flight, but Airbus had only sold 38 to four airlines by end of 1977 
and was beginning to look like another failure.
110
 When an order to Western Airlines fell through 
in 1977, Eastern Airlines took advantage of Airbus’ weak position: Airbus lent Eastern four 
aircraft for Eastern’s New York to Miami route rent-free.
111
 Eastern found the A-300 more 
reliable and had lower fuel costs than the L-1011, but the A-300 had higher operating costs 
because it was larger.
112
 Airbus decided to compensate Eastern for the difference in operating 
costs, and Eastern agreed to buy 23 A-300s.
113
 In comparison to the triple engine L-1011 and 
DC-10, the A-300 had only two engines saving on maintenance and weight and allowed for more 
seats with its compact design.
114
 In 1978, Boeing announced its wide-body 767 twinjet to 
compete with the A-300 and its narrow body 757 to succeed the 727, but these were years away 
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 During the oil crisis of 1979, Airbus outsold Boeing in wide-body airliners 
and developed the A-310 as a smaller version of the A-300.
116
 The wide-body Boeing 767 and 
Airbus A-300 and A-310 were the new generation of aircraft which cut costs by carrying more 
people with fewer engines.
117
 The reliability of these wide-body twinjets allowed the FAA to 
agree to a new rule which increased the maximum time a plane could be from an emergency 
landing strip from 75 to 120 minutes, and this rule allowed certain aircraft designated ETOPS 
(extended twin operations) to fly direct routes across the Atlantic.
118
 Airbus would continue to 
expanding its fleet of commercial aircraft with the A-320 to compete with Boeing’s 737 and 
Douglas’ MD-80 series for short range routes and then the A-330 and A-340 to compete head-to-
head with Boeing, and by 1994, Airbus overtook Boeing in number of orders.
119
 On the other 
hand, Boeing’s 747 had been premature in the 1960s with only Pan Am in need of such huge 
aircraft, but by the 1980s, the 747 was perfect for the market.
120
 By the 1980s, the 747 was 
relatively cheap to make having been in production for 20 years and with high demand and no 
rival to it, Boeing made huge profits which could be used to cut prices on its smaller aircraft and 
earn more revenues from parts and services.
121
 The rivalry between Airbus and Boeing continues 
to this day.   
III. Elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board 
A. Regulatory Context 
Beginning in 1938, the CAB regulated the US airline industry, protecting the airlines 
from market forces by limiting entry of air carriers into new markets and regulating fares which 
                                                 
115




 Ibid, 299. 
118
 Ibid, 300. 
119
 Ibid, 302.  
120
 Ibid, 302-3. 
121
 Ibid, 303. 
 Institutional Setting and Carrier Viability in the Airline Industry  22 
 
ensured the airlines some level of profit. Fifty years after the Spoils Conference at which 
Postmaster Brown handpicked airlines to succeed, those four airlines (United, American, 
Eastern, and TWA) remained the largest domestic carriers. Meanwhile, Pan Am, which Brown 
had granted a monopoly of overseas flights, remained the leading international carrier.
122
 
Between the 1938 and 1978, of the 16 original trunk-line carriers, only five had received 
permission to merge, and no major airline had ever gone bankrupt thanks to the CAB’s protected 
rate of return.
123
 Even if an airline applied to serve a route served by others, competitors would 
object with protracted legal objections.
124
 The established airlines, their banks, and their labor 
union supported CAB regulation - deregulation threaten the status quo of guaranteed profits.
125
 
However, Senator Edward Kennedy strongly called for deregulation and even some of the CAB 
staff supported deregulation. In 1975, Senator Kennedy held Judiciary Committee hearings to 
discuss the inefficiencies of regulation.
126
 By April 1976, the CAB announced its support for 
deregulation acknowledging the inefficiencies of aviation regulation.
127
 Appointed to the head of 
CAB in 1976, John Robson began modest reforms from within the CAB such as approving 
discount fares and expanded charter operations.
128
 For instance, Freddie Laker, owner of British 
charter carrier Lake Airways, started a new transatlantic service called Skytrain which offered 
ultra-low fares with no reservations and no travel agents.
129
 In response to new low-fare charter 
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In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed economist Alfred Kahn to head of the CAB. 
Kahn had studied and researched regulation of telephone and electricity markets, and he began to 
make administrative reforms at the CAB so that market outcomes were preferred over 
regulation.
131
 In October 1978, President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act into law in 
large part due to Senator Kennedy and Alfred Kahn. This act phased out the CAB’s regulatory 
oversight by January 1983 and eliminated the Board by 1985 (Borenstein and Rose 2013: 12).
132
 
Interestingly, one regulatory aspect remained intact was the Essential Air Services which 
provided subsidies and oversight to small communities; this program was planned to be phased 
out in the 1980s, but the program still exists today due to continuous political pressures to 
maintain access to air travel for small population centers. With President Carter’s approval, the 
CAB quickly began to implement the reforms to encourage industry decision-making by market 
forces. Deregulation provided many expected results as well as surprises.  
B. Motivations for Deregulation 
Although regulation had provided industry stability and technological innovation, it led to 
market inefficiencies which prompted economic studies. First, evidence began to show that 
unregulated intrastate markets (e.g. California and Texas) had lower fares and higher service.
133
 
Using California’s Los Angeles-San Francisco as a test case, Levine 1965 argued that “The 
economic evils which the air transport industry and its regulators fear will occur without 
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regulation have not materialized”.
134
  Second, some economists began to argue that the airline 
industry had neither significant economies of scale nor barriers to entry which were usually used 
as reasons to regulate industries.
135
 An industry with large economies of scale can result in 
natural monopoly because the monopolist must produce a large quantity to supply the market in 
order to not earn negative profits; if another firm entered the market and split the output, neither 
firm would be able to earn profits and both would exit the market leaving consumers without the 
product. Economies of scales can act as a barrier to entry since a firm must produce a minimum 
level of output before it can earn non-negative profits. Without economies of scale or barriers to 
entry, the industry no longer needed regulation to prevent natural monopoly power from 
developing.  
Closely tied to the argument of economies of scale and barriers to entry, a third argument 
in support of deregulation lay in the theory of contestable markets with economists such as 
Elizabeth Bailey and William Baumol as strong proponents. Unlike perfect competition, 
contestability implies that a large number of firms is not necessary to ensure that firms do not 
earn monopolistic rents from consumers. If a market has low barriers to entry and exit and no 
sunk costs, contestability says that a market with one or few firms may approximate perfect 
competition because just the threat of a new entrant will ensure that the firm(s) will act in a 
competitive manner. In an unregulated airline industry, a carrier could easily enter a profitable 
city-pair market by just moving a plane to this route, and simply this threat of entry promotes 
competitive prices on a route controlled by a single carrier. A few years after deregulation, 
Bailey and Panzar 1981 stated “airline markets are basically contestable” and “In a perfectly 
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contestable natural monopoly market, actual entry is redundant. The mere threat of entry will 
discipline the market even if it is a natural monopoly”.
136
 Deregulation brought an end to the 
CAB’s authority to regulate market entry and exit which was important for the contestability 
theory. The idea that potential competition in a market produced the same economic results as 
actual competition remained an untested theory which had its opponents. Finding evidence of a 
middle ground, Morrison and Winston 1987 concluded that airlines are not perfectly contestable 
but may be imperfectly contestable, meaning potential competition may still affect welfare.
137
  
 After economists began to support deregulation as way to improve economic welfare, 
politicians like Senator Edward Kennedy voiced support for airline deregulation using 
economists’ arguments. Supporters of deregulation argued that it would improve consumer 
welfare with lower fares and better service as carriers faced competition from other incumbents 
and new entrants to the market. In the next section, the post-deregulation reality will be 
discussed in some detail to demonstrate that deregulation was largely successful but had 
unexpected consequences as well.  
IV. Post-Deregulation Experience 
Regulation of the airlines ensured a stable industry where the government controlled 
fares, routes, entry and exit, and safety standards. The CAB sought to provide airlines with a fair 
rate of return and passengers with a safe and reasonably priced mode of travel. However, when 
economists and politicians began to see the benefits of a deregulated airline industry, the 
legislation to promote competitive forces in the industry was passed spawning a wave of 
deregulation in other industries as well. Deregulation had many consequences, some that were 
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expected and others unexpected. This section is devoted to briefly discussing what happened to 
the airline industry since deregulation 35 years ago in terms of the economic successes (or 
failures) as described by academics and as demonstrated by the industry statistics for a more 
visual understanding.  
A. Route Structures 
 Under regulation, the CAB strictly controlled which carriers could enter or exit a route. 
One of the first surprises of deregulation is how carriers quickly moved from point-to-point 
network configurations to hub-and-spoke networks. Although hub-and-spoke networks existed 
prior to deregulation, more carriers moved to this more efficient system as competition began to 
push airlines to find ways to improve their operations. The hub-and-spoke network allows 
airlines to funnel passengers from different cities with the same final destination on to the same 
flight to the destination from a hub airport. One measure of the industry’s efficiency is load 
factor which is the percentage of seats on a flight filled by revenue-paying customers. Because 
the marginal cost of carrying an additional passenger is close to zero until the plane is full, 
carriers desire to fill the plane to capacity to maximize profits. In 1970, the industry’s load factor 
was only 48.5 percent which was a warning sign of the inefficiencies of the industry created by 
regulation. Although the industry load factor was trending upwards prior to regulation, the trend 
has continued to rise to all-time highs. In 1978, the load factor was 61.5 percent, but in 2010, it 
reached an unprecedented 82.1 percent. Even though the load factor dropped temporarily 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, airlines over the past decade have found better ways 
to fill planes raising the industry load factor by over 12 percentage points between 2001 and 
2010. Figure 1 below illustrates the annual industrywide load factor and highlights 1978 and 
2001. 
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Figure 1 - Data from Various Airlines for America Annual Economic Reports 
The efficiency gains by the airlines as demonstrated with increased load factors has 
contributed to the decrease in fares (discussed below), but hub-and-spoke systems also allowed 
carriers to increase schedule frequency which improved consumer welfare even more. Morrison 
and Winston 1995 estimated the benefits of increased frequency relative to frequency pre-
deregulation to be $15.2 billion in 2013 dollars.
138
 However, one of consumers’ biggest 
complaints of these networks is the need for connecting flights. Morrison and Winston 1995 
found that this complaint was unfounded: 28 percent of passengers changed planes in 1978 and 
32 percent of passengers changed planes in 1993.
139
 Similarly, Borenstein and Rose 2013 report 
that after adjusting for trip distance (since the need for connection is greater for longer trips), “a 
substantially smaller share of customers changed planes in 2011 than in 1979”.
140
 Passengers 
have also benefited as the need to change airlines has decreased as well. Changing airlines 
increased the probability of missing connections and lost luggage; when making a connection 
within an airline, the carrier’s schedule is designed to allow for passengers connecting from 
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various cities to make the connecting flight, unlike making connections across carriers. The 
percentage of trips requiring a change in airlines has decreased from 11.2 percent in 1978 to just 
1.2 percent in 1990.
141
  
Although hub-and-spoke networks have contributed to the lower fares with efficiency 
gains, they have also led to “fortress hubs” at which single carriers exert market power. 
Borenstein 1989 states that “dominance of major airports by one or two carriers, in many cases 
the result of hub formation, appears to result in higher fares for consumers who want to fly to or 
from these airports,” but “the market power of a dominant airline does not spill over substantially 
to other airlines serving the same airport or routes”.
142
 Carriers have used marketing strategies 
including frequent flyer programs, travel agent commission override bonuses (TACOs), and 
biases in computer reservation systems owned by carriers to increase their market share at hub 
airports.
143
 Also, dominant carriers at congested airports may prevent competitors from entering 
or expanding operations at an airport by limiting gate access.
144
 Overall, the advantages of hub-
and-spoke networks seem to outweigh the disadvantages for both passengers and carriers. 
B. Price Competition 
Prior to deregulation, the CAB controlled the fares at which airlines could charge forcing 
them to compete on other attributes such as schedule frequency and in-flight service and food 
quality; today, airlines primarily compete on price. After deregulation, the industry witnessed 
several waves of new entrants followed by mergers and acquisitions as new carriers tried to 
capture market share and legacy carriers used their market power to fight back. The number of 
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competitors in a market is a key determinant of the price of the airfare. Although the simple 
economic model suggests that more carriers (i.e. more competition) would lead to lower prices, 
this does not consider that airlines compete head-to-head at the route level, not on a national 
scale. Morrison and Winston 1995 found that even though there were fewer effective carriers at 
the national level after deregulation, the level of carrier competition has not decreased and “at the 
route level airlines are clearly more competitive than they were under regulation”.
145
 They found 
that deregulation has led to fares being 22 percent lower than they would have been under 
regulation on average and has saved flyers about $18.3 billion in 2013 dollars per year.
146
 
However, the decreases in fares were not spread evenly across all flights. Prices on longer routes 
fell more, and on shorter routes which had been cross-subsidized under regulation, the fares 
decreased by less or even increased on some routes.
147
  
As seen in Figure 2 below, the number of effective competitors on routes increased 
following deregulation and then became relatively stable since the mid-1980s with some 
variation due to economic cycles. As noted above, passengers flying on longer routes saw their 
fares decreases as the number of effective competitors increased on those routes, but passengers 
on shorter routes faced lower decreases or even some increases which can be explained by the 
relatively lower increase (and recently decrease) in number of effective competitors on shorter 
routes. Morrison and Winston note that level of competition on a route is not only determined by 
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the number of competitors but also by the “identity” of carriers (i.e. low cost carriers).
148
 Thus, 
the fares may decrease by more on a route if a low cost carrier enters relative to another carrier.  
 
Figure 2 - Morrison, Steven A., and Clifford Winston, “The State of Airline Competition and Prospective Mergers", 
testimony April 24, 2008, 4. 
Another way to see the effects of deregulation on airfares is to consider the passenger 
yield which is a measure of average fare per mile per passenger. Figure 3 below illustrates the 
industry passenger yield in 2013 cents. Again, the trend before deregulation was a decline, but 
this downward trend has continued for the past 35 years. In 1978, the passenger yield was 23.5¢ 
and 12.7¢ in 2009 (constant 2013 dollars). The decline in passenger yield provides more 
evidence that on average airfares have declined since deregulation.  
 
Figure 3 - Data from Various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
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One of the biggest surprises of deregulation was the variation in prices paid by customers 
on the same route, or price dispersion. When airlines began to compete on price in addition to 
service quality, they found clever ways to charge different prices to customers with different 
elasticities (i.e. price discrimination). Consumers are well-aware of the benefits of buying tickets 
far-in-advance or staying at the destination over a Saturday night as airlines have found that 
business travelers and leisure travelers, who are more price sensitive, reveal their preferences 
when purchasing. To price discriminate, three market conditions must exist: 1.) the firm must 
have some level of market power in order to charge above marginal cost, 2.) the customers must 
be heterogeneous (i.e. have different price elasticities) and carriers must be able to distinguish 
between them, and 3.) to avoid arbitrage, the customer must not be able to resell the product.
149
 
Although consumers with lower price elasticities face higher fares, price discrimination in theory 
does not lead to a less efficient outcome. Instead, there is an exchange of surplus from consumers 
to producers. In the airline industry, Stavins 1996 found that price discrimination decreases with 
market concentration and “even when carriers face competition on a route, they effectively 
compete only for the price-elastic segment of the market, while retaining market power in the 




Although the topic of price discrimination by the airlines is a common complaint, the 
wide range in prices paid by passengers on the same flights (i.e. price dispersion) can be 
explained by price discrimination or cost differences. It might not seem obvious that the cost of 
providing a seat on a flight to one passenger pay cost more than another, but a business travel 
may pay a higher price because they demand more frequent service (thus higher costs to the 
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 The variation in airfares paid by customers on the same flight is one example of an 
unexpected consequence of deregulation.  
C. Service Attributes 
One of the major objections to deregulation was how competitive forces would affect the 
safety of flying even though the FAA would continue to regulate safety after economic 
regulation was phased out. People feared that as airlines’ profits fell, the carriers would cut costs 
by skimping on necessary maintenance or hiring less qualified pilots; they were also concerned 
that commuter airlines with worse safety records would replace the larger airlines in smaller 
cities.
152
 Despite these safety concerns, “virtually all measures of accident or fatality risk suggest 
that the long-term trend toward increased airline safety has continued since economic 
deregulation”.
153
 According to Rose 1991, there was a relative decrease in accidents caused by 
something under a carrier’s control after deregulation.
154
 However, Rose 1991 did find some 
evidence that passengers flying on commuter airlines are at a higher risk, but it is difficult to 
separate if this is because shorter routes tend to use smaller planes which are more susceptible to 
mechanical failure or the airports served by commuters have lower quality of navigational aids or 
have more dangerous flying conditions.
155
 After the FAA increased safety regulations on 
commuter airlines in 1978, safety on commuter airlines greatly improved.
156
 Similarly, the public 
feared that new entrants after regulation would be less safe than the established airlines, but 
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academics have concluded that the safety records of new entrants and established carriers do not 
significantly differ on a variety of safety metrics.
157
  
A less obvious way that deregulation affected safety is related to how consumers 
switched modes of travel as airfares dropped in the wake of deregulation. As fares dropped, 
people switched from traveling by car on highways to traveling by plane, and this substitution 
away from the more dangerous automobile transportation has benefited consumers. One estimate 
is that more than 300 lives are saved annually by shifting to flying.
158
  
In addition to the FAA’s safety regulations for airlines, the carriers have strong incentives 
to ensure a high level of safety regardless of regulations. If a carrier has a poor safety record, 
consumers will avoid this carrier for a carrier with a better safety record. If a carrier had an 
accident on a flight, the airline would be responsible for damages to the passengers hurt or killed, 
and carriers with a lower safety record would face higher insurance costs. According to Crandall 
and Winston 2008, “the market, and in some cases the liability system, provide sufficient 
incentives for firms to behave in a socially beneficial manner” and that since the FAA will never 
have the same level of information as the airlines do regarding best safety practices, the regulator 
will always remain behind the airlines in promoting safety.
159
  
Another service attribute that is of high-importance to consumers is on-time performance 
of airlines. Flight delays and cancellations have many causes including weather which is 
generally beyond a carrier’s or air traffic control’s control, airline’s scheduling and availability 
of equipment and personnel, and inefficient infrastructure investment and utilization policies.
160
 
                                                 
157
 Ibid, 15. 
158
 Ibid, 10. 
159
 Robert W. Crandall and Clifford Winston, “Airlines are Safer than Ever,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2008, 
accessed via http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/04/19-airlines-winston. 
160
 Severin Borenstein and Nancy L. Rose, “How Airline Markets Work…Or Do They?,” In Economic Regulation 
and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, ed. N.L. Rose (NBER and University of Chicago, forthcoming), 29. 
 Institutional Setting and Carrier Viability in the Airline Industry  34 
 
The discussion of on-time performance will be continued under the Infrastructure Implications 
section.  
D. Non-Price Competition  
 After deregulation, hub-and-spoke networks pushed airlines toward a new, more complex 
fare structure; with the help of computer reservation systems, carriers began to find ways to price 
discriminate on customers with different price elasticities. However, carriers also changed their 
marketing schemes with new ideas like frequent flyer programs which rewarded repeat 
customers with free flights or seat upgrades. These brand loyalty programs provided carriers with 
a way to regain market power. When making a travel decision today, a customer is more likely to 
purchase a ticket from the airline he is more likely to fly with in the future. In other words, 
“Loyalty programs soften price competition across carriers, as they induce a switching cost for 
travelers (or travel agents) by raising net cost if travel is spread over several airlines rather than 
concentrated on a single airline over time”.
161
 Frequent flyer programs provide particular 
advantage at airports where the carrier has a large market share.
162
  
 Although the use of travel agents has declined dramatically in the last decade, airlines 
turned to travel agents who used carrier-owned computer reservation systems to book tickets. 
Airlines would increase the commission rates for travel agents who met a specified sales target 
with a particular airline so travel agents had an incentive to direct their customers towards the 
airline with whom they had acontract. These TACOs (Travel Agency Commission Overrides) 
gave carriers strategic advantages and helped to increase market share in cities where travel 
agents could push customers to a particular carrier. However, as computer technology has 
advantage, the almost ubiquitous access to the internet in the US has allowed for airlines and 
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consumers to bypass travel agents over the last decade. Between 1977 and 1989, the percentage 
of airlines’ operating expenses on commissions increased from 4.05 percent to 11.35 percent, but 
this number reached a peak in 1993 of 11.97 percent and crashed down to 1.45 percent in 
2005.
163
 As Figure 4 illustrates, the need for airlines to provide travel agents with incentives to 
direct customers in their direction has declined quickly. Today, airlines can sell tickets directly to 
consumers of their own websites preventing the need for middlemen in travel agents and saving 
both themselves and passengers money.  
 
Figure 4 - Data from Adam M. Pilarski, Why Can’t We Make Money in Aviation? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 56. 
E. Infrastructure Implications 
 The development of the US airway infrastructure occurred over the 20
th
 century during 
which the country experienced multiple wars, economic recessions and expansions, and 
unforeseeable advances in technology. All these factors influenced how the airline industry and 
the national air travel infrastructure grew, and with the overall economic and population growth 
of the US over the past century, the growth of air travel, too, is no surprise. To distinguish the 
causal effects of air travel growth due to deregulation or various other factors such as 
globalization is a difficult and probably impossible task, but the decrease in average fares and 
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increase in flight options resulting from deregulation probably has had a significant positive 
effect on the continued growth of air travel in the US. Many measures can help provide a clear 
picture of this growth of the airline industry. First, the number of passenger enplanements is 
simply the number of passengers who boarded scheduled service flights. Between 1947 and 
1977, the number of passenger enplanements increased from 14.3 million passenger 
enplanements to 240.3 million, or by 7.9 million per year on average. After deregulation in 1978 
through 2010, this number increased from 274.7 million to 720.5 million, or by 16.0 million per 
year on average. Figure 5 illustrates the change in growth rate after deregulation, but this 
increase can be attributed to many factors in addition to deregulation. The disadvantage of using 
passenger enplanements to look at the growth of the industry is that it does not factor in the 
increase mileage flown with the increase in number of passengers.  
 
Figure 5 - Data from various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
 Next, to adjust for the increase mileage flown by passengers, the revenue passenger miles 
(RPMs) are analyzed. RPMs are simply the number of revenue passengers multiplied by the 
number of miles flown (one RPM is created when one passenger flies one mile). Similarly to 
passenger enplanements, the growth rate of RPMs increased after deregulation. Between 1955 
and 1977, RPMs rose from 24.4 billion to 193.2 billion, or by 8.3 billion per year on average. 
 Institutional Setting and Carrier Viability in the Airline Industry  37 
 
Between 1978 and 2010, RPMs increased from 226.8 billion to 798.0 billion, or by 19.8 billion 
per year on average.  
 
Figure 6 - Data from various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
 More people fly and fly farther than they used to, and these trends have implications for 
on-time performance given limited air traffic control capacity especially at chronically congested 
airports such as Newark International, LaGuardia, and Kennedy in the New York metropolitan 
area. In 2011, 40 of 100 most delayed flights departed or arrived into Newark.
164
 In May 2008, 
the FAA set caps for the number of flights per hour at JFK and Newark airports to help reduce 
congestion and delays stemming from these airports. In 1988, about 20 percent of all flights 
arrived more than 15 minutes past scheduled arrival time, but this number reached 27 percent in 
2000 even though airlines have begun to “pad” scheduled flight times.
165
 Because airlines 
operated in a highly interconnected network, delays at one airport can create more delays which 
can spread further through the network. As air traffic capacity is reached at major airports, delays 
will inevitably spread beyond the congested airport, and the costs of flying will increase unless 
improvements are made to the current system. As seen in Figure 7, the number of departures per 
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year has been increasing, indicating the need for air traffic control capacity to expand in line in 
order to minimize delays for customers. According to Borenstein and Rose 2013, “Airport 
congestion and flight delays, which are among the most visible and significant declines in 
service quality, may be attributed more to the success of deregulation in increasing traffic and to 
the failure of infrastructure policy to keep pace with traffic growth than to altered carrier 




Figure 7 - Data from Various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
F. Carrier Financial Performance 
 Academics seem to conclude that consumers have benefited tremendously from 
deregulation, but the industry as a whole has struggled to earn profits without the stability 
provided by regulation. Between 1955 and 1978, the industry averaged a net profit margin of 
2.81 percent with a standard deviation of 2.27 and did not experience a negative net profit 
margin during that period. Between 1979 and 2010, the average net profit margin was -0.34 
percent with a standard deviation of 5.74. Clearly, deregulation resulted in a more competitive 
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and volatile industry. Figure 8 displays annual net profit margins between 1955 and 2010. Before 
deregulation, the industry earned stable positive returns, but soon after 1978, the industry faced 
the oil crisis which was the beginning of instability. During the economic downturn in the early 
1990s, the industry struggled as well, but soon recovered as the economy began to grow in the 
late 1990s. However, 2001 reflects another turning point where the volatility of the net profit 
margins increased dramatically: the net profit margin in 2002 was -10.6 percent, 6.8 percent in 
2004, -18 percent in 2005, 11 percent in 2006, and -12.8 percent in 2008. While much of the 
variation can probably be explained by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the global financial crisis in 
2008, the ability of the industry to sustain itself in the face of high uncertainty is unclear. Real 
Operating Profits show a similar story in Figure 9. This quick analysis of US carriers financial 
performance pre- and post- deregulation provides clues that regulation secured stable returns for 
carriers and that deregulation exposed the industry to competitive forces which created instability 
and tied the industry’s performance closely to the national and global economic climate.  
 
Figure 8 - Data from Various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
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Figure 9 - Data from Adam M. Pilarski, Why Can’t We Make Money in Aviation? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 18. 
G. Market Entry, Exit, and Firm Consolidation 
 As discussed above, the regulated airline industry remained largely stable with carriers 
such as American, Delta, Pan Am, TWA, and United dominating the interstate markets. The 
CAB had prevented carriers from entering markets occupied by other incumbent carriers and 
rarely did carriers merge. Since deregulation in 1978, the industry has faced a series of waves of 
entry and exit which continues to the present day. In the first five years or so following 
deregulation, a wave of new entrants entered into the interstate airline market challenging the 
established legacy incumbent carriers. These new entrants included previous local and regional 
carriers (e.g. Frontier, Republic, US Air), intrastate airlines (e.g. Air California, Southwest), 
charter airlines (e.g. ATA, Capitol), and new airlines (e.g. Midway, New York Air, 
PEOPLExpress). Between 1978 and 1985, industry reached an all-time low concentration at 82 
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percent for the 10-firm ratio and 46 percent for the 4-firm ratio.
167
 However, the original trunk 
carriers began to respond to the new competition over the next decade. 
 After a series of mergers and acquisitions and bankruptcies, the original trunk airlines 
regained much of their previous market share by 1991 with concentrations reaching 97 percent 
for the 10-firm ratio and 69 percent for the 4-firm ratio.
168
 Major established airlines such as 
Braniff, Eastern, and Pan Am went bankrupt, and Delta acquired Western. The remaining large 
carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Air) used acquisitions, 
alliances with regional and commuter airlines, control of airport gates and slots, and new 
marketing techniques such as computer reservation systems owned by the carriers themselves, 
frequent flyer programs, and TACOs to regain market share.
169
 The advantages of the large 
carriers allowed them to regain market control in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but during the 
mid-1990s, the industry faced another waves of entrants such as JetBlue and ValuJet/AirTran 
recapturing some market share.  
 During the late 1990s, the US economic expansion and increased demand for air travel 
allowed for the major airlines to regain some market power briefly. However, the industry has 
faced a high level of instability since 2000. According to Goetz 2009, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and the subsequent four-day shutdown, drop in demand with the economic recession, increased 
security restrictions, the SARS scare, growing concerns of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
increasing fuel costs have contributed to the industry’s decade or so of instability.
170
 The legacy 
carriers were hit particularly hard with Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways filing for 
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bankruptcy by 2002, American’s acquiring TWA in 2001, and merging of US Airways and 
America West in 2005.
171
 While the legacy carriers have struggled, low-cost carriers such as 
Southwest and JetBlue have been profitable during this tumultuous period, but the industry as a 
whole has been hurt by rising fuel prices. Figure 10 below shows Southwest’s Net Profit Margins 
relative to the Industry’s Net Profit Margins; Southwest has been able to consistently earn 
positive profit margins even during economic recessions. Although Southwest’s profit margins 
have fallen since its services began in the early 1970s, this carrier has outperformed the industry 
except for a few years in the highly volatile post 9/11 period. However, the convergence of the 
two time series may suggest that the industry has begun to found ways to compete with 
Southwest. 
 
Figure 10 - Data from Various A4A Annual Economic Reports and Various Southwest Airlines Company Reports 
V. Policy Implications 
A. Consumer Mobility and Satisfaction 
 In just over a century, the airline industry dramatically changed how people travel both 
across the country and overseas. More recently, deregulation helped to accelerate the growth of 
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the industry. As noted above, a vast array of retail metrics illustrates the growth of the industry 
since 1978. As competitive forces have pushed airfares downwards, flying has become more 
affordable for more people. During the first decades of the airline industry, only wealthy 
Americans could afford to travel by plane even though comfort did not improve until cabin 
pressurization was introduced in 1937. Larger planes with more powerful engines allowed for 
economies of scales and lower fares, but regulation prevented the industry from finding cost-
reducing efficiencies. Deregulation brought fares down on average especially on longer flights 
which has greatly benefited consumers. While shorter routes saw smaller decreases and even 
some increases, these routes had been cross-subsidized by more profitable longer routes under 
regulation. Passengers on these routes now pay closer to the true cost to the carrier. Figure 11 
shows that passengers are flying farther on average than ever before. Today, the overall 
decreases in airfares have opened the skies to almost all Americans. 
 
Figure 11 - Data from Various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
 In addition to the benefits of decreased fares for consumers, airlines are flying more 
frequent schedules providing consumers with more flexibility in their travel plans. The growth of 
hub-and-spoke networks after deregulation as airlines sought efficiencies gains have also 
provided consumers with more travel options. If a passenger departing Boston to Los Angeles 
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cannot make the direct flight, carriers have multiple other flights flying to Los Angeles via other 
hubs where the passenger can make a connecting flight. Scheduling flexibility with hub-and-
spoke networks has greatly benefited consumers.  
 Although passenger complaints about the minimal service and crowded flights seem 
common today, the growth of low-cost carriers such as Southwest and JetBlue provide 
contradictory evidence. With LCCs, consumers trade lower fares for reduced amenities and 
comfort, and their growth suggests that passengers are willing to sacrifice these luxuries to save 
money. The increase in load factors indicates that flights are more crowded, but it also means 
that airlines have found ways to improve efficiency which in turn leads to lower fares. In an 
effort to earn the business of both types of passengers, carriers offer (at additional cost) extra 
amenities such as roomier seats and better quality food and beverages for passengers who want a 
higher level of service. Overall, consumers today have lower fares and more flight options with 
the availability of extra comfort for purchase than under regulation.  
B. Aggregate Economic Welfare 
 The ultimate measure of deregulation’s economic success is the change in aggregate 
welfare. Relative to pre-deregulation, more consumers are flying today than ever before in the 
history of commercial aviation. In 1950, the industry carried about 19.2 million revenue 
passengers, but in 2010, the airlines flew over 720 million revenue passengers. Table 1 shows the 
annual revenue enplanements at the start of each decade. The equilibrium quantities have clearly 
grown rapidly over the past sixty years with the most significant growth after deregulation.  
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Table 1 - Data from Various America for Airlines Annual Economic Reports 
 
 Today, consumers have greatly benefited from lower airfares improving their economic 
welfare as they are able to travel to more locations around the world for lower prices. At the end 
of the regulated era in 1978, the passenger yield was 23.5¢. Since deregulation, the passenger 
yield has declined to 12.7¢ in 2009 (constant 2013 dollars) as airlines have found efficiencies. 
According to Morrison and Winston 1995, the 22 percent decrease in average fares due to 
deregulation has led to an annual $18.3 billion (constant 2013 dollars) welfare gain by 
consumers.
172
 Not only have consumers benefited from lower prices, they have gained from the 
increase in flight frequency which resulted as airlines moved to the more efficient hub-and-spoke 
network configuration. Morrison and Winston 1995 calculated that consumers have benefited 
$15.2 billion (constant 2013 dollars) from the increased flight frequency relative to pre-
deregulation.
173
 Overall, consumers have experienced a substantial increase in their economic 
welfare as declining prices have allowed more people to fly to more destinations around the 
world.  
C. Fiscal Considerations 
 The growth of air travel has begun to strain the national airspace capacity as the current 
air traffic control system developed in the 1960s can only handle a certain level of air traffic. To 
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accommodate projected passenger growth, the FAA has begun to upgrade the national air traffic 
control system which uses radar tracking with global positioning satellites with the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). According to the FAA, NextGen uses satellite 
and digital technologies along with new procedures to improve air travel in a variety of ways: 
“NextGen efficiency enhances safety, reduces delays, saves fuel and reduces aircraft exhaust 
emissions”.
174
 With a modernized ATC system, planes will be able to fly more direct routes 
which will decrease flight times and save on fuel costs. The FAA estimates that the cumulative 
benefits between 2012 and 2030 will be $47 billion in aircraft direct operating costs and $107 
billion in passengers’ value of time in terms of delays, $5.9 billion in reduced flight time, $3.4 
billion in fewer flight cancellations, $379 million in reduced CO2 emissions, and $17.7 billion in 
other savings such as safety improvements and FAA cost savings.
175
 Overall in that period, the 
FAA projects that NextGen will result in $3.50 in benefits for every $1 invested.
176
  
 Despite the high expected long-term returns from the NextGen investment, the 
implementation is behind schedule: for example, the En Route Automation Modernization 
(ERAM) program is four years behind schedule and $330 million over budget.
177
 Although 
NextGen has no opponents in Congress, White House, or the industry, the delays in the FAA’s 
implementation has threatened the success of the highly important modernization program. 
While US taxpayers are covering $27 billion, airlines are expected to invest over $10 billion to 
prepare for NextGen, but the airlines have become concerned about making expensive 
investments while the FAA remains behind schedule because they fear that by the time NextGen 
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is operational, the technology will be obsolete.
178
 Considering the poor financial conditions of 
the airlines in the last decade, the investments by the carriers are very risky without government 
incentives. One idea is to give planes equipped with NextGen priority for landing and take-off, 
and other planes will be forced to wait to take-off and to land.
179
 Another idea is for the federal 
government to provide the airlines with loan-guarantees so airlines can afford to upgrade their 




 NextGen promises to increase airspace capacity which is essential to meet forecasted 
demand growth in the upcoming decades, but the increases in air traffic control capacity must 
also be met with additional airport capacity. The two most direct ways to increase airport 
capacity is to build new runways at already congested airports and to build new commercial 
airports. Runways, however, require significant lead time for master planning, environmental 
impact studies, and land acquisition and may take decades to plan and then build.
181
 In the last 
forty years, only two major commercial airports have been built: Denver International Airport 
and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. The FAA expects that in the next 20 to 30 years 
that four additional airports will be needed in already congested regions such as Atlanta, 
Chicago, Las Vegas, and San Diego.
182
 Although NextGen will allow for more planes in the 
national airspace, the new system will also help reduce congestion at airports will help 
counteract this increase. In order to meet the expected growth of air travel demand, the US 
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government and airlines will need to continue investments into the national airspace capacity via 
NextGen and airport capacity.  
D. Industry Labor Effects 
 Labor is a very important input into the airlines’ business because carriers need highly-
skilled pilots to fly planes, well-trained mechanics to ensure the safety of passengers, and flight 
attendants who are the public face of the airlines. Given that the airline industry is heavily-
unionized, labor costs are neither characterized as variable costs nor fixed costs.
183
 Until 
recently, labor costs have account for the largest share of airlines’ total costs. Figure 12 shows 
the cumulative shares of total costs for various components between 1977 and 2005. In 1978, 
labor costs were about 44 percent of total costs and about 34 percent in 2005.  
 
Figure 12 - Data from Adam M. Pilarski, Why Can’t We Make Money in Aviation? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 56. 
 During the early 2000s with the severe drop in air travel demand, US Airways, United, 
Northwest, and Delta fell into bankruptcy which allowed for these carriers to negotiate large 
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compensation reductions with its labor unions.
184
 Even when airlines are struggling financially, 
labor unsurprisingly will oppose compensation cuts, but when carriers declare bankruptcy, the 
court has the authority to impose these labor cuts. However, when airlines are performing better 
financially, labor tries to capture part of the growing profits, but the multi-year collective 
bargaining agreements with labor unions prevent immediate redistribution of profits to labor. 
The stickiness of labor costs for airlines has become a growing concern as a cause of volatility in 
the industry.  
E. Long-Run Sustainability 
 While deregulation has significantly benefitted consumers, the introduction of 
competitive forces to the airlines has created an industry characterized by instability. Regulation 
protected incumbent carriers from new entrants and ensured a fair rate of return; deregulation 
quickly encouraged established carriers and new entrants to compete on routes and to find 
innovative ways to improve efficiency and reduce operational costs. The decades following 
deregulation saw a series of waves of new entrants, followed by exits via bankruptcies and 
mergers and acquisitions, then by the growth of low cost carriers more recently. As the industry 
has become more competitive and globalized, the airlines have become highly dependent on the 
overall state of the economy. This economic linkage makes carriers susceptible to economic 
recessions such as those in the early 1990s and the Great Recession following the financial crisis 
of 2009. Since 2001 especially, the industry has become extremely volatile resulting in a new 
wave of mergers and acquisitions including Delta and Northwest, United and Continental, 
Southwest and AirTran, and most recently US Airways and American. As the number of carriers 
has decreased, concerns about the level of competition in industry have grown. Have the 
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competitive forces from deregulation finally become too destructive for the airlines to continue 
existing without the need to reintroduce regulation to stabilize the industry? 
 According to Borenstein and Rose 2013, two theories of “destructive competition” are 
used to argue that competition is unsustainable in the airline industry.
185
 The first theory argues 
that the industry has high fixed costs and specific assets used to produce a homogenous product 
and faces highly cyclical demand and frequent price shocks to variable costs, and these 
conditions lead to underinvestment.
186
 The second theory is related to the idea of the “empty 
core” due to the existence of network and scope economies.
187
 The idea of the “empty core” 
attempts to explain the periodic waves of entries and exits in the industry. The idea that airlines 
will naturally result in destructive competition was used to support regulation in the early 20
th
 
century, but today, “there is little empirical support for either an empty core or natural monopoly 
characterization of the airline industry”.
188
 If the volatile nature of the industry cannot be 
explained by destructive nature of competition, what else could explain the instability facing 
airlines? 
 In an attempt to answer this question, various factors which have been attributed to the 
volatility of the industry are examined. First, the industry has argued that the high tax burden on 
airlines cannot be passed on to consumers because of the high levels of competition between 
carriers. Although the average tax as a percentage of base airfare has doubled since the 1980s 
from about 8 percent to 16 percent, the average dollar tax per ticket is about the same today as it 
was in the late 1990s when the industry was earning record profits.
189
 Despite the changes of 
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how airfares are taxed over the last 30 years, Borenstein 2011 explains that airlines are 
eventually able to pass through taxes to consumers as the industry adjusts in the long-run which 
suggests that taxes have probably not been a contributing factor to the industrial instability.
190
  
Both fuel price increases and volatility have hit airlines especially hard. According to the 
Air Transport Association, fuel costs have now surpassed labor costs as the largest expense for 
passenger airlines and the fuel cost per passenger-mile has more than doubled from about 2¢ per 
RPM in 2001 to 4.06¢ per RPM in 2010.
191
 Since flight schedules are set, the fuel costs are 
essentially fixed for the marginal passenger on a flight until the airline changes flight frequency, 
but carrier faces steep costs of changing schedules even in the face of fuel price shocks.
192
 
Unable to adjust to quick rises in fuel prices, carriers are unable to pass the cost increases onto 
passengers in the short-run. Unfortunately, the volatility of fuel prices appears to be a new 
normal for the industry which will require innovative business ideas such as upgrading to more 
fuel efficient fleets to counteract rapidly changing fuel prices.  
As discussed earlier, the airlines financial conditions have become closely correlated with 
the overall health of the national and global economy. When a single carrier is struggling 
financially, the firm can sell their aircraft and equipment on resale markets. However, when all 
carriers experience a drop in demand, they are unable to recover their “fixed” capital costs.
193
 
Although Borenstein 2011 argues that unexpected demand shocks cannot explain weak financial 
performance prior to 9/11, the article suggests that demand shocks of unprecedented levels 
following 9/11 and the financial crisis were a major contributor to the larges profit losses during 
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  Presuming that the demand drops following 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008 
were truly rare and unpredictable events, airlines could not have anticipated the losses of the 
2000s. 
Another final factor which has arguably contributed to the weakened financial health of 
the industry is the growth of low-cost carriers. Both LCC incumbents and LCC entrants have 
been slowly capturing more and more market share from the legacy carriers who once dominated 
the skies. Between 1994 and 2009, LCCs’ market share increased from about 10 percent to about 
24 percent, and LCCs compete at over 60 percent of all origin-destination pairs.
195
 LLCs have 
found that customers are more than willing to trade low fares in exchange for a reduction in 
comfort and other amenities. During the deregulated era, legacy carriers’ costs have been 30 to 
60 percent higher than LCCs’ costs (after adjusting for average flight distance) and 40 percent 
higher on average in the previous decade.
196
 While not every LCC has succeeded since 
deregulation (e.g. People Express), Southwest has successfully earned consistent profits even 
during the last highly volatile decade. The competition from LCCs like Southwest has clearly 
contributed to the losses by legacy carriers even as they use hub domination to restrict gate 
access, landing slots, and other resources from potential entrants and frequent flyer programs to 
maintain some market power.
197
  
Many factors have contributed to the instability of the airline industry including demand 
shocks, sticky labor and capital costs, volatile fuel costs, and growth of LCCs. The long-run 
sustainability of the industry and individual carriers will depend on how they adjust to a more 
unpredictable environment. Legacy carriers may face the choice to either move towards the LCC 
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model or to differentiate their services. Deregulation forced the airlines to adapt to competitive 
forces. Some suffered, some disappeared, and some have thrived, but clearly, the real winners 
are consumers who fly to more destinations, more frequently, and for less money. 
VI. Forward-Looking Policy Conclusions 
 For consumers, deregulation has brought substantial benefits over the past 35 years 
primarily through lower airfares and more flight options. For the airlines, deregulation has 
unleashed an era of dogfighting between the incumbent legacy carriers and various entrants. 
While some carriers have developed successful business models to compete in the deregulated 
market (most notably Southwest), the industry on a whole has suffered in cycles, but since 2001, 
the airlines have witnessed a prolonged period of high instability. Economists have offered 
various explanations for this instability in the industry including volatile and rising fuel prices, 
severe macroeconomic recessions in the global economy, and the growing market share of 
LCCs. To survive in this increasingly competitive market, airlines need to find long-term 
solutions. However, some of their proposed solutions cannot be achieved without government 
backing. 
First, the implementation of NextGen is in the hands of the FAA, but the modernization 
of the national air traffic control system is reportedly behind schedule and over budget even 
though NextGen promises to bring large economic and environmental gains. In the name of 
further deregulation, one suggested solution is privatizing the national air traffic control. In 1996, 
Canada established NavCanada, a private sector ATC organization, which is financed by 
publicly traded debt, and privatization has led to improved technological modernization, safety, 
and service quality for passengers.
198
 Privatization of the US ATC would provide better 
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economic incentives to expedite the implementation of NextGen so that travel times decrease 
with more direct routes and less congestion-caused delays. Also, airlines will save on fuel costs. 
Similarly, airport privatization could “encourage (smaller) private airports to compete for 
(smaller) aircraft operations by, for example, taking advantage of advances in GPS technology 
that have improved access to smaller airports, by upgrading runways and gates, and by offering 
van and rental car service to improve travelers’ access to the central city and other parts of the 
metropolitan area”.
199
 Privatization of ATC and airports may help encourage technological 
improvements and more competition. 
Since high fuel prices appear to be the new normal for all modes of transportation, 
airlines will continue to upgrade their fleets to more fuel efficient aircraft in the upcoming years. 
As the costs of delaying buying more fuel efficient planes become higher, this trend encourages 
carriers to seek cost-savings in order to remain competitive with LCCs which have newer and 
more fuel-efficient fleets. The danger for airlines is not necessarily higher fuel prices but rather 
volatile fuel prices. Airlines cannot adjust their operations to sudden surges in fuel prices which 
can lead to large losses. As the end of high and volatile fuel prices is not in sight, the airline 
industry will need to find ways to upgrade their fleets despite their current weak financial 
conditions and learn better ways to adjust to unpredictable spikes in fuel costs.  
While government approval of airline mergers may seem almost counterintuitive to the 
goals of deregulation, consolidation offers the financially weak airlines an opportunity to 
rationalize their networks and thus improve operational efficiency. As discussed above, the past 
decade has seen a wave of mergers between some of the largest airlines which has created fear of 
anti-competitive effects. During a Congressional Hearing regarding the American Airlines – US 
Airways Merger, Winston provided testimony suggesting that the merger would allow the two 
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merged carriers to optimize its network with route exits and entries, to expand its international 
network providing consumers with more destinations, and to retire its less efficient aircraft more 
quickly.
200
 Also, Winston explains that “retrospective empirical assessments of airline mergers 
have generally found that the presence of a merged air carrier in a market does not lead to higher 
fares”.
201
 In an attempt to sooth concerns that consolidation may lead to higher prices, Winston 
argues that the government can work to counteract any anti-competitive effects by encouraging 
competition in two other ways. One, American and foreign governments should negotiate more 
Open Skies Agreements which give US and foreign airlines more access to enter and set fares in 
US international markets. In preliminary estimates, Winston and Yan 2012 found that previously 
negotiated Open Skies deals have generated $5 billion in annual gains to passengers and estimate 
that consumers could gain another $5 billion a year if the US government reached these 
agreements with other countries with which the US has significant international passenger 
traffic.
202
 Two, Winston testified that “The final step to create a highly competitive global airline 
industry would be for the United States to allow foreign airlines to serve U.S. domestic markers. 
(Other countries should also allow foreign carriers, including U.S. carriers, to serve their 
domestic markets).”
203
 According to Winston, opening the US domestic market to foreign 
carriers such as Ryanair or British Airways would lead to more competition and thus lower fares 
and service improvements and does not pose a threat to national security or safety.
204
 Although 
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Winston makes his case to encourage a more globally competitive airline industry, his 
suggestions are politically infeasible in the current national political climate.  
In conclusion, the airline industry has faced a tumultuous period of financial instability 
that continues to threaten long-term sustainability of the industry. Fortunately, various policy 
options exist that may provide airlines with the opportunity to improve their business and also 
may lead to economic welfare gains for the whole country. The future of the airline industry is 
heavily dependent on the decisions of both US policymakers and the airlines themselves in 
response to an increasingly global airline market.  
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